By Peter Agi
Consensus is meant to cut cost and avoid violence. Done badly, it does the opposite and plants landmines the party steps on later. It concentrates grievance because aspirants feel they lost to a person, not a process. It weakens internal legitimacy when members ask why they joined if they cannot contest. It creates anti-party incentives as blocked aspirants quietly fund opposition candidates. It triggers post-primary lawsuits because “consensus” without written consent from every aspirant violates the Electoral Act. It alienates new entrants who see a closed shop and walk away. It masks regional and religious imbalance when one zone gets “consensus” repeatedly while others are told to wait.
It breeds godfatherism by making consensus a euphemism for one man’s pick. It reduces voter enthusiasm because a pre-decided ticket depresses turnout. It hurts candidate quality when loyalty beats electability. It makes reconciliation harder because there was no contest to lose gracefully — people were excluded. It exports crisis to the general election as aggrieved blocs stay home or vote opposition. It empowers opposition messaging that “APC = imposition.” It breaks zoning arrangements when consensus is used to bypass gentlemen’s agreements. It overloads the NWC because every dispute lands in Abuja. It creates parallel executives as losing camps run shadow structures until they defect. It increases cost because “settling” stepped-down aspirants becomes a budget item. It devalues delegates since their votes no longer matter. It freezes party growth when LGA and ward leaders stop recruiting for tickets they can’t influence. It risks INEC rejection if forms, signatures, or timelines are defective. And it can blow up a state before Abuja even notices — Osun 2022, Adamawa 2023, and Rivers 2023 all trace back to consensus or imposition fights.
When consensus goes wrong and the APC fractures, opposition parties gain without spending much. Defections bring ready-made structures, ward leaders, and donor lists into PDP, LP, NNPP, or new platforms. Anti-party voting spikes as aggrieved APC blocs punish the party at the ballot rather than in court. Messaging writes itself — “imposition,” “one-man party,” and “no internal democracy” become campaign ads. Recruitment gets easier because youth and women locked out by consensus look for open tickets elsewhere. Fundraising improves as businessmen hedging bets move money to opposition candidates they once ignored. Court cases multiply and distract APC from campaigning while opposition consolidates. Zoning aggrieved zones flip and deliver bloc votes to opposition for the first time in years. Media narrative shifts to “APC crisis” while opposition gets free coverage as the stable alternative. Grassroots enthusiasm rises on the other side because voters who felt their primary was stolen want to prove a point in the general. And the long game: each implosion weakens APC’s brand of discipline and competence, making the next election cycle easier for opponents even if they lose this one.
Should governors be given unlimited, unprecedented power to choose candidates?
Arguments FOR giving governors decisive power to pick.
Governors bear responsibility for state results and need a team that aligns with them. Consensus under a governor reduces primary violence that has cost lives in Nigeria. It lowers the cost of politics because one campaign team emerges early instead of five. Governors can balance senatorial, ethnic, and religious interests faster than thousands of delegates. They know who funded the party between elections and can reward loyalty that keeps the structure alive. They understand LG voting patterns and can pick electable candidates, not just good speakers. It speeds up candidate emergence and avoids six months of litigation before INEC deadlines. It aligns the executive and legislature so budgets and projects move. It blocks hijack by Abuja moneybags who parachute in every four years. It maintains discipline because total free-for-all signals there is no party hierarchy. It protects the party brand by screening out candidates with disqualifying baggage. It helps manage federal character since governors coordinate with the president on national balance. It gives a governor control of post-election governance instead of fighting his own lawmakers. It reflects political reality because governors fund the party day-to-day. It avoids factional primaries and the parallel congresses seen in Kano, Zamfara, and Rivers. It can give minorities a real shot when a governor zones a ticket to a group that could never win delegates. It enables continuity so a successor completes projects. It reduces pre-election suits when only one form goes to INEC. It matches what PDP and APGA ruling governors historically do, so APC would not unilaterally disarm. And it makes accountability clearer — if the governor picks and they fail, voters know who to blame next cycle.
Arguments AGAINST giving governors unlimited power to choose.
Unlimited power violates internal democracy and the APC Constitution plus the Electoral Act which prioritize primaries. It creates single-point failure because if the governor misreads the state, APC loses the state. It institutionalizes godfatherism and turns temporary influence into permanent fiefdom. It demoralizes the base as ward and LGA leaders stop work when tickets are never open. It triggers defections as blocked aspirants leave with their structures, like the 2022–2023 wave to PDP, LP, and NNPP. It produces weak candidates because loyalty to a governor is not popularity with voters. It breeds corruption as aspirants pay governors directly, raising the price of tickets. It undermines the NWC and NEC by reducing national organs to rubber stamps. It destroys the delegate system since there is no reason to hold congresses if one man decides. It increases litigation risk because Electoral Act s.84(9) requires written consent of all aspirants for consensus — one objection voids it. It hurts general election turnout when voters sense imposition and stay home, dragging down even the presidential vote. There is no succession check, so an underperforming governor can impose an underperforming successor. It invites Abuja–state clashes when the president or NWC wants different NASS candidates than the governor.
It ignores local knowledge because governors know the state capital but not every LG nuance delegates live with. It provokes ethnic and religious backlash if one zone monopolizes picks. Ex-governors keep picking after office, creating permanent control without a mandate. It violates the spirit of “Not Too Young To Run” because youth and women cannot raise governor-level access to be anointed. Reconciliation becomes theater when appeals go to the same governor who imposed. It hands the opposition a simple campaign line: “Vote APC and one man picks your leaders.” And it fails the constitutional spirit of fair process under S. 40 of the 1999 Constitution.
Balancing the argument.
Both sides carry weight. Unlimited governor power buys short-term order and ends with long-term fracture. Pure open primaries buy legitimacy and risk blood, bankruptcy, and parallel congresses. The problem is not consensus. The problem is unaccountable consensus.
A workable middle:
Consensus is valid only if every aspirant signs the prescribed forms and consent is filed with INEC as the law demands. The governor chairs the process but does not vote alone — state caucus votes with the governor, senators, House caucus, Assembly caucus, and state chairman each carrying one vote. Reserve a portion of consensus slots for under-40s and women, otherwise those seats go to primaries. If a consensus candidate loses the general by a wide margin, that zone gets an automatic open primary next cycle. Publish minutes and sign-offs within forty-eight hours so deals are not secret. The NWC can veto only for constitutional or legal breach, with written reasons in seven days, not for preference.
Governors need influence because they carry the state and the risk. Unlimited, unprecedented power guarantees control today and implosion tomorrow. APC breaks when members feel the party is a private estate. It holds when power is shared, rules are written, and consensus means consent, not command.
If APC wants to survive 2027, it must avoid both extremes. Strong governors, limited by clear rules and an NWC that enforces them, is the line between order and implosion.
What happens to alienated candidates now that the Electoral Act bars party-hopping?
When consensus or a governor’s pick shuts candidates out, they used to decamp and contest elsewhere. S.84(13) of the Electoral Act 2022 changed that. If you participated in one party’s primary, you cannot be nominated by another party for the same election cycle. INEC will reject you.
So what can disgruntled aspirants still do?
Stay and fight inside. They file pre-election suits challenging the consensus process. One missing signature or faulty report can nullify the ticket. Zamfara 2019 and Rivers 2019 show how the whole party can lose the ballot this way.
Run anti-party from within. They remain APC on paper but fund, endorse, or direct their structure to vote opposition. It’s legal. Party discipline is weak, and proving anti-party is hard before elections end.
Sabotage turnout. They tell their base to sit out. A governor’s candidate can’t win if the party’s own strongholds record 20% turnout. No law compels you to mobilize.
Capture the structure for next cycle. They lose this election with everyone else, then use the defeat to take over ward/LGA/state congresses. “Your imposition failed us” becomes the campaign to replace the governor’s men.
Negotiate appointments. Many accept commissioner, board, or agency slots to stay quiet. Risk: if the deal isn’t honored, the grievance doubles by next election.
Become financiers, not candidates. They can’t run, but they can bankroll opponents, civil society attacks, or media against the imposed candidate. Influence without being on the ballot.
Quit politics. The quietest outcome. Technocrats and first-timers just walk away. The party loses competence and renews only with loyalists.
The law blocked the exit door to another ticket, not the ways to make the party lose. Alienated candidates can’t decamp and run, but they can still sue, sit out, spoil, or seize the party later. Consensus without real consent now carries more risk, because aggrieved aspirants are trapped inside with nothing to lose.
Bottom line: The Electoral Act forces grievance to play out within APC, not outside. If the process feels unfair, the implosion happens after the primaries instead of before.
Agi, FCA, writes from Ijegu-Ojor,Yala LGA.
